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We explore a fundamental aspect of firms’ location choices largely overlooked in the literature:
strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less
appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms’ profits. Strategic interaction also impacts
location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location
choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market
and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other
markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are
preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher-value markets. However, when learning
is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower-value to higher-value
markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
What determines firms’ geographic expansion
strategies? Most of the literature emphasizes the
role of location characteristics (Caves, 1996) and
predicts that firms collocate in the most valuable
markets (Alca´cer, 2006). Casual observation,
however, suggests a more nuanced picture of firm
behavior, in which firms leverage their competitive
position across markets and time. For example,
Walmart favored rural markets, where competition
was weak or nonexistent, before entering densely
populated ones, where Kmart was a strong
incumbent. Similarly, Emirates Airlines honed its
business model in less competitive routes before
entering markets served by strong competitors
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such as British Airways and Air France. Examples
like these indicate that firms take their rivals’
current and future locations into account, plotting
their own expansions across time and markets
in a deliberate location strategy to grow and
defend their relative competitive positions. A
geographic diversification strategy thus resembles
a chess game: each move depends not only on the
board—an array of potential locations—but also
on the pieces in play—firm heterogeneity—and,
more importantly, on the interaction between
players—strategic interaction. Exploring firms’
location choices without including all three
components misses key elements of the game.
In this paper, we ask: How does strategic
interaction and learning across time and mar-
kets influence location strategies? By answer-
ing this question, we bring strategic interaction
back to the discussion of location choices, a per-
spective that has not received much attention
since it was proposed by Hotelling (1929) in the
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industrial organization (IO) literature and assimi-
lated into the international business (IB) literature
by Knickerbocker (1973) and Hymer (1976). The
few papers that did look into the effect of strategic
interactions on location choices, such as Flyer and
Shaver (2003), took a static approach, even though
in reality firms choose strategies dynamically,
evaluating the trade-offs of potential geographic
expansion paths across time and markets. A single
decision that appears suboptimal may actually be
part of an overall location strategy that guarantees
the firm’s long-term competitive advantage.
Learning introduces dynamic trade-offs to loca-
tion strategies. Learning processes lie at the heart
of our understanding of how firms build capabili-
ties to generate and sustain competitive advantage,
and geographic expansion is often cited as a tool to
elicit learning. Chang (1995) and Guille´n (2002),
for example, associated firm capability and learn-
ing with entry decisions; Delios and Henisz (2003)
and Perkins (forthcoming) showed that learning
from institutional environments affects firms’ loca-
tion choices as well as their subsequent perfor-
mance in a host country. While bringing dynam-
ics (through learning) into the realm of location
choices, these studies overlooked the role of inter-
actions between rival firms, an important feature of
oligopolistic competition that characterizes multi-
national enterprises (MNEs). By highlighting the
role of strategic interaction in location choices
while incorporating dynamic trade-offs associated
with learning across time and markets, our study
mimics more closely the realities of global compe-
tition and provides new insights into competitors’
strategic location choices.
We take a formal approach. In particular, we
employ a game-theoretical model in which het-
erogeneous firms choose to enter new geographic
markets across time, taking their competitors’
actions into account. The model is solved using the
traditional game theory concept of sub-game per-
fect equilibrium under three learning scenarios: no
learning, local learning, and global learning. These
scenarios capture the ability of a firm to transfer its
capabilities across markets. With no learning, firms
keep their initial capability levels across time.
With local learning, capability gains are location-
specific and are not transferrable across markets.
With global learning, firms can transfer capabilities
gained in one market to other markets.
When location characteristics alone drive loca-
tion choices, as the literature generally asserts,
collocation is the predicted outcome in every case.
In contrast, with strategic interaction, two equilib-
rium strategies emerge from our baseline model:
collocate and avoid. In fact, our model suggests
that collocation is the exception rather than the
norm. We identify how these strategies, collo-
cate and avoid, are more or less likely to emerge
depending on (1) heterogeneity between locations
(market attractiveness), (2) heterogeneity between
firms (relative firm capabilities), (3) competition
intensity (the erosion in market profits resulting
from the way firms compete), and (4) scenarios and
rates of learning. Using the chess analogy, the first
two factors account for the board and the pieces
at play, while the third one underpins the strate-
gic interaction between players. Learning adds an
extra element that brings dynamism to the strategic
interaction.
The model suggests that firms will always
avoid each other initially when markets are
similar, because capturing the total value of a
slightly smaller market is preferable to sharing a
marginally larger market with a rival. Only when
one market becomes disproportionately less attrac-
tive does collocation emerge. When markets are
dissimilar, symmetry in capabilities leads to more
collocation. As a less capable firm improves is rel-
ative competitive standing, it is better able to brave
competition in a significantly larger market instead
of aiming for monopoly rents in a considerably
smaller market. Notably, increasing competition
intensity erodes the potential profits firms may
earn, even in a larger market, and thereby increases
the likelihood that firms avoid each other.
Two novel effects that drive location strategies
emerge when firms learn in the markets they
occupy: (1) the entrenchment benefit of entering
a market early, and (2) the opportunity cost of
not entering the other market. When firms expand
into new geographic markets, they have a vast set
of common options from which to choose. But
entering a new market requires resources, so firms
are limited in the number of markets they can
enter simultaneously in a given period of time.
In effect, a firm that chooses one new geographic
market improves its competitive position in that
market but also postpones its entry into other
potential markets, giving competitors in those
markets valuable lead time to improve their
competitive positions. This trade-off—between
the benefits of entering and the opportunity costs
of postponing—determines whether firms will
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choose a location strategy that avoids competitors
or one that collocates with them. As a result, a
firm is driven not only by relative market size, its
initial capabilities, and competition intensity, but
also by the need to preserve, improve, or minimize
the erosion of its relative competitive position
over time (as its competitors learn). How effective
firms are at this task depends on the learning rate
and learning scenario. Under local learning, as the
learning rate increases, the entrenchment benefit
of early entry increases (decreasing collocation),
as does the opportunity cost of not entering
the other market (increasing collocation). We
use numerical estimation to predict the overall
effect and find that the faster the learning rate,
the more likely it is that collocation emerges.
Under global learning, the ability of firms to
transfer improvements in firm capabilities across
markets decreases the propensity to collocate.
Both entrenchment benefits and opportunity costs
are very robust strategic effects: they emerge
regardless of the order or timing (sequential or
simultaneous) with which firms enter.
As in any attempt to formalize a complex
phenomenon, we face a trade-off between
narrow richness—taking a few elements that
are fully characterized—and comprehensive
simplicity—including all elements but in a styl-
ized manner. We opted for the latter. We condense
the many dimensions of location heterogeneity
that are common to all firms, such as regulation
and market size, into a single measure of market
value. We model firm heterogeneity through initial
competitive positions represented by the share of
market value a firm can capture. We model strate-
gic interaction based on competition intensity and
how knowledge is accumulated and transferred on
a limited time horizon. Moreover, we model only
two of the aspects of knowledge diffusion that
affect strategic interaction: its speed—through
learning rates—and its scope—through global
learning and local learning scenarios.
Clearly, this approach misses some of the rich-
ness present in competitive landscapes: locations
vary in more than their potential value, competitors
differ along many dimensions, strategic interaction
may be triggered by factors other than competi-
tion intensity and learning, competitors may be
numerous, and learning can occur across firms
and is more than a one-dimensional phenomenon.
However, we believe that, in spite of its simplic-
ity, our model captures the essential aspects of
the context we are studying. More importantly, it
offers a comprehensive approach to understanding
the drivers of firm location choices by modeling
the impact not only of location, but also of strate-
gic interactions among heterogeneous firms.
MODELING APPROACH
We employ a game-theoretical model to explore
how strategic interaction and learning jointly
affect the geographic expansion of heterogeneous
firms across time and markets. We assume an
oligopolistic industry in which firms offer a
homogenous product that potentially appeals to
multiple markets worldwide. In this context, global
expansion is desirable, and selecting locations
across countries becomes critical not only because
it increases profits, but also because it could
improve, preserve, or minimize the erosion of a
firm’s competitive position.
Our approach is two-fold. We first develop
a stylized model that provides the intuition for
the four effects that drive entry choices: market
value, competition, entrenchment benefits, and
opportunity costs. The advantage of this model is
that it is simple, easy to follow, and reasonably
general. However, because it does not capture
the richness of more specific models or predict
an unambiguous net impact of learning on entry
choices for each of the learning scenarios we con-
sider, we complement it with numerical analyses
based on a specific, well-established competition
model (the Cournot model of competition based
on quantities) and a specific functional form for
learning (an exponential learning curve). Both the
Cournot model and the exponential learning curve
fit reasonably well in our stylized model.
The stylized model
In our stylized model, two firms, i = h , l (high-
capability and low-capability, respectively),
expand sequentially into two markets, j = H , L
(high-value and low-value, respectively). Markets
differ in the value firms might appropriate, denoted
by V j.1 We consider that V L = γ V H , so γ repre-
sents the relative value of market L, and γ ∈ [0,1].
1 We understand that market value may vary depending on firm
capabilities. To keep the model simple and tractable, we keep V
fixed for now, but will allow it to be endogenously determined
in the numerical solution of our Cournot model.
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For example, when γ = 0.5, the gross profits in the
low-value market, V L, are half of those in the high-
value market, V H . In addition, to reflect the idea
that competition reduces market profits, we define
the market value under duopoly as W j = ρV j , with
ρ ∈ [0,1]. For example, when ρ = 0.5, duopoly
market value becomes 50 percent of the monopoly
market value. The parameter ρ captures the effect
of competition intensity, e.g., the extent to which
market value is eroded because of the mode firms
use to compete. Lower values of ρ are associated
with higher competition intensity. For instance,
price competition (Bertrand) results in more
market value erosion, making competition more
intense, and has a lower value of ρ associated with
it compared to quantity competition (Cournot).
We introduce firm heterogeneity through differ-
ences in firms’ initial capabilities to produce and
sell in markets. Any capability advantage that a
firm has over its competitor (e.g., better manage-
ment, higher efficiency, superior product quality,
etc.) is reflected in a larger market share and gross
profit. We denote with αijt the share of market
value that firm i captures in market j in period
t when it competes with its rival, − i . Firms’
gross profits are π ljt =αljt W j and πhjt =αhjt W j ,
and αljt +αhjt = 1. Note that αljt reflects the rel-
ative capability of firm l with respect to firm h:
a more capable firm will capture a larger propor-
tion of market value. We assume that αlj 1 < 1/2,
so that firm l is less capable in the first period,2
and that its disadvantage is equal across markets,
that is, αlL1 =αlH 1 =αl1. Note that there are only
two relevant competitors in the model and there
are no local firms in any market.
In this stylized model, we make no assump-
tion about the competition mode (i.e., Bertrand,
Cournot, etc.) between the two firms. This allows
us to focus on conceptual development and to
make robust predictions about the direction in
which strategic interaction with learning impacts
entry choices. However, to make predictions about
the overall impact of strategic interaction under
learning on firms’ entry choices, we need a spe-
cific mode of competition as well as well-specified
functional forms for profit generation and learn-
ing. For illustration, we use a quantity-competition
Cournot model with exponential learning.
2 This assumption is without loss of generality since the other
case, αhj 1 < 1/2, is symmetrical.
In the Cournot model, the markets are charac-
terized by inverse demand functions p =j − q ,
where p represents price, q represents quantity,
and j represents the potential market size, that
is, the quantity sold in market j when the price
is zero (j = H , L). For simplicity, we normalize
the potential size of the high-value market, H ,
to 1 and denote that of the low-value market with
L = ≤ 1, so  parallels the parameter γ from
our baseline model. Firm heterogeneity is cap-
tured by differences in firms’ marginal costs: the
low-capability firm l has a marginal cost cl = c,
while the high-capability firm h has a marginal
cost ch = εc, where ε ≤ 1. A higher value of ε
means that firm h has a smaller capability advan-
tage over its rival, allowing firm l to capture a
relatively larger share (though still less than half)
of the market, thus ε parallels the parameter αl1 in
our baseline model.
We make several assumptions about the timing
of the game. First, we assume that firms expand
to one market per period. Restricting entry to no
more than one market is sensible because man-
agers are limited in their capacity to supervise
simultaneous expansions, financial resources for
concurrently opening operations may not be avail-
able, and transferring technology into new mar-
kets is difficult. For example, IKEA enters new
markets very slowly in order to guarantee homo-
geneity in operations across countries and to min-
imize external financing.3 Second, we assume that
firms expand sequentially. We favor a model of
sequential entry (rather than simultaneous entry)
for factual and practical reasons. Our motivating
examples (Walmart vs. Kmart; Emirates vs. British
Airways) as well as casual observations suggest
that firms observe their competitors’ entry behav-
ior and can react when making entry decisions,
which is inconsistent with the assumption of a
simultaneous-entry model. Finally, within the con-
text of a sequential-entry model, we assume that
the high-capability firm h enters first into a market
and the low-capability firm l enters into a market
upon observing its rival’s action. We make this
assumption purely for expositional reasons, as it
allows us to avoid repetition and present the effects
underlying entry for a single firm. We acknowl-
edge that these assumptions impact equilibrium
outcomes; as such, in APPENDIX 1 we discuss
3 Milne, R. “IKEA chief drops plan to double pace of store
openings,” Financial Times , 1 September, 2013.
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Table 1. Timing
t = 1 (a) h expands into a market
(b) l expands into a market after observing h’s
choice
(c) l and h compete and decide how much to
produce; first-period profits and
second-period capabilities realized
t = 2 (a) l and h expand in the other markets
(b) l and h compete and decide how much to
produce; second-period profits realized
several models based on different entry order and
timing, and show that our analysis and the main
effects underlying entry choices are the same as in
our baseline model, where the high-capability firm
enters first.
The timing of the game is depicted in Table 1.
Firm i ’s strategy, si , is defined as a
tuple si = sit | t = 1, 2, where sit represents
firm i ’s market presence in period t , with
sit ∈ {(∅, ∅),(L, ∅),(∅,H ),(L,H )}. For example, if
firm l enters market H in period 1 and market
L in period 2, we write the firm’s strategy as
sl ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}. For simplicity, we assume
there are no fixed costs, and we restrict the
parameters so that firms are always profitable in
all markets. Therefore, firms do not exit from
markets entered in the first period, and they
always enter the remaining market in the second
period.4 As a result, the markets that the two firms
enter in the first period uniquely determine the
strategies for the entire game. To save on notation,
we use s = LL, LH, HL, or HH to describe the
strategies employed by both firms, where the
first (second) letter indicates the market that the
high-capability (low-capability) firm enters in the
first period. For instance, s = HL means that firm
h follows strategy sh ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}, entering
market H first, and firm l follows strategy
sl ={(L, ∅),(L,H )}, entering market L first.
4 These assumptions are without a loss of generality in terms
of the effects that drive firms’ entry choices. In terms of the
numerical results, they only impact the range of parameters over
which firms employ one entry strategy or another. In particular,
any positive fixed costs of production would have the same
impact on profits regardless of the market a firm enters, and thus
it would not affect the firm’s location preference. Fixed costs
would, however, affect the firm’s decision to enter or remain
in a market at all. Consequently, the range of parameters over
which firms are always profitable in both markets is smaller; over
the remainder of the range, the firm might choose not to enter
in the remaining market or it might choose to exit altogether.
Firm 
Firm Firm 
Π ,Π Π ,Π Π ,Π Π ,Π
Market 
Market 
Market 
Market 
Figure 1. The game tree: the high-capability firm
moving first
Strategic interaction between the firms happens
in two dimensions; one pertains to entry and the
other to competition. In each period, the firm that
moves first makes its entry choice anticipating its
rival’s optimal response. Then, in each period,
firms engage in competition, whereby their choices
(e.g., price, quantity, etc.) take into consideration
their rivals’ choices.
Firms choose strategies that maximize their
total profits across time and markets considering
rivals’ moves. Consequently, total profits depend
on firms’ strategies, and we denote firm i ’s profits
by si . If under strategy s , firm i enters marketj in the first period and market – j in the second
period, its total profit across time is si = π sij 1 +
π sij 2 + π si−j 2.5 For example, if both firms enter
high-value market H in the first period (s = HH ),
firm l ’s total profit will be HHl = πHHlH 1 + πHHlL2 +
πHHlH 2 . Figure 1 illustrates all the possible strategies
the firms can employ and the profit outcomes
associated with each strategy.
Note that in the absence of strategic interaction,
firms will make entry choices based solely on
location characteristics. As a result, both firms will
enter high-value market H in the first period and
low-value market L in the second period, a path
of continuous collocation that corresponds to the
first, left-most branch in the game tree depicted in
Figure 1.
To provide a more realistic representation of
actual firm behavior, we follow previous work
in economics (Spence, 1981) and management
(Epple, Argote, and Devadas, 1991), and introduce
5 For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting of future
profits. As with the assumption about fixed costs, this is without
loss of generality in terms of the effects driving firms’ entry
choices; in terms of numerical results, this assumption only
impacts the range of parameters over which firms employ one
entry strategy or another. For a model with discounting across
time and fixed costs, please refer to Alca´cer et al. (2013).
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dynamic firm capabilities by assuming that firms
learn from experience. As firms become more
familiar with the production process in a new
market, identify the best suppliers there, develop
working routines, and adapt their technology to
market conditions and regulations, they are able
to improve their absolute capabilities. We assume
that improvement happens at a learning rate λ. In
the Cournot specification of our model, we follow
Spence (1981) and assume that firms’ marginal
costs follow an exponential learning curve with
a common learning rate λ, where λ≥ 0. Thus, the
second-period cost of firm i in market j , where
it first entered and produced a quantity qij 1, is
given by:
cij 2 = ci1 e−λqij 1 (1)
A unique advantage of multimarket firms is their
ability to transfer knowledge across markets and
leverage learning in one market for their operations
in another (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Hence,
we assume that a fraction of the learning in one
market is transferrable to other markets, and denote
the transferability rate as μ∈ [0,1]. Thus, if firm
i enters and produces in market j in the first
period, its second-period cost in market j will
be determined according to Equation 1, and its
second-period cost in the other market, − j , will
be given by:
ci−j 2 = ci1 e−μλqij 1 (2)
Although learning improves a firm’s absolute
capability, the effect on its relative capability is
unclear until the rival’s learning is calculated. Let
αslj 2 denote firm l ’s second-period relative capa-
bility in market j when firms follow strategy s at
time t = 1. For example, when high-capability firm
h enters high-value market H , and low-capability
firm l enters low-value market L, firm l ’s second-
period relative capability in market j is αHLlj 2 ; when
both firms enter the high-value market at time
t = 1, firm l ’s second-period relative capability in
market j is αHHlj 2 . Thus, a firm can use its expan-
sion to affect its own and its rival’s learning and
to improve, preserve, or minimize the erosion of
its relative capability. Learning is the key element
in the model that links entry decisions across time.
To investigate the effect of learning on firms’
entry strategies, we analyze our model in three
scenarios that differ in how firms’ relative
capabilities (αijt ) change over time: no learning
(firms’ absolute and relative capabilities are static
and identical across markets), local learning (the
cumulative experience a firm gains in one market
improves its second-period absolute capability
only in that market), and global learning (a firm’s
cumulative experience improves its second-period
absolute capability across all markets). Regardless
of the learning scenario, we solve the game by
backward induction and use the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium (SGPNE) concept to identify
the equilibrium strategies that maximize firms’
overall profits.
The no-learning scenario
Under the no-learning scenario, firms’ absolute
and relative capabilities do not depend on their
first-period strategies and are static across time
and markets (αsij 2 = αHLij 2 = αHHij 2 = αLHij 2 = αi1,
∀ i = h , l and ∀ j = H , L). Similarly, firms’ second-
period profits do not depend on first-period strate-
gies. Consequently, we identify equilibrium
strategies comparing only first-period profits.
Assume that high-capability firm h enters high-
value market H in the first period (strategy
sh1 = (∅,H )). Low-capability firm l can either
avoid firm h by entering low-value market L (strat-
egy sl1 = (L, ∅), with associated profit π lL1 = V L),
or collocate with firm h by entering the high-value
market (strategy sl1 = (∅,H ), with associated profit
π lH 1 =αl1W H =αl1ρV H ). Firm l will avoid firm
h when its benefit from being a monopolist in the
low-value market, V L, is greater than its benefit
from sharing the high-value market, αl1ρV H , that
is, when
γ > αl1ρ (NL − l)
Naturally, when firm l enters low-value market
L (if (NL − l) holds), firm h has no incentive to
deviate from its strategy of entering high-value
market H : being a monopolist in market H and
earning V H is better than competing in market
L and earning αh1W L. In fact, even if firm l
enters high-value market H (if (NL − l ) fails to
hold), firm h has no incentive to deviate from
its strategy of entering high-value market H . By
entering low-value market L, firm h would earn
V L, whereas by remaining in high-value market
H , it would earn αh1W H . But firm h’s profit in
high-value market H is larger than firm l ’s profit
in the same market (αh1W H >αl1W H ), and since
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firm l already prefers to enter high-value market
H (αl1W H > V L), it follows that firm h prefers
the same option (αh1W H > V L).
As a result, two distinctive equilibrium entry
strategies emerge, depending on whether condi-
tion (NL − l ) holds. When condition (NL − l )
holds, firms locate apart in the first period:
high-capability firm h enters high-value market
H and low-capability firm l enters low-value
market L. This equilibrium strategy, which we
name avoid , corresponds to sh ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}
and sl ={(L, ∅),(L,H )}. When condition (NL-
l ) fails, low-capability firm l initially enters
high-value market H , as well. This equilibrium
strategy, which we name collocate, corresponds
to sh ={(∅,H ),(L,H )} and sl ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}.
These two equilibrium entry strategies—firms
avoid each other or they collocate—depend on
two fundamental effects: the market value effect
and the competition effect. The market value
effect, parameterized by γ , captures the idea that
as markets become more similar in value (if
γ increases), firm l ’s loss from entering low-
value market L, given by V H − V L = (1 − γ )V H ,
decreases. As a result, firms are more likely to
adopt the avoid strategy. By contrast, as markets
become more dissimilar (as γ decreases), firm l ’s
loss from entering low-value market L increases,
making it more likely that firms adopt the collocate
strategy.
The competition effect captures firm-level profit
erosion resulting from (1) competition intensity ,
which reduces market value, and from (2) mar-
ket sharing , which reduces a firm’s share of the
already reduced market value. Competition inten-
sity , parameterized by ρ, reflects the idea that
as competition intensifies (ρ decreases), firm l
has more to lose by entering high-value mar-
ket H (because market value erodes from V H to
W H = ρV H ), thereby making it more likely that
firms adopt the avoid strategy.
Market sharing reflects the idea that, when
firms compete, firm l ’s share of the market
decreases from a monopoly share of 100 percent
to one determined by its relative capabilities,
parameterized by αl1. If firm l ’s relative capability
weakens (if αl1 decreases), firm l has more to lose
by entering high-value market H because it can
only capture a smaller part of the reduced market
value (αl1W H ). Because firm h decided to enter
high-value market H , both firms become more
likely to adopt the avoid strategy. By contrast,
1
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Figure 2. Equilibrium strategies: no-learning scenario
if firms become more similar, they also become
likely to adopt the collocate strategy.
Figure 2 shows the equilibrium areas determined
by condition (NL − l ). The change along the
y-axis reflects the market value effect, the change
along the x -axis reflects the market sharing effect,
and the pivoting of the line in Figure 2 reflects
the competition intensity effect. Summarizing the
above, an increase in the value of low-value
market L (an increase in γ , for a fixed capability
differential αl1) has the equivalent effect of an
increase in the intensity of competition or a
decrease in firm l ’s relative capability (a decrease
in ρ or αl1, for a fixed market-value differential
γ ), all resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of
collocation. In fact, our model shows that firms
never collocate when markets are similar in value
(when γ is high) because capturing the total value
of a slightly smaller market is preferred to sharing
a slightly larger market with a rival.
Recall that without strategic interaction, firms
choose markets myopically, e.g., based only on
their characteristics (market value) without con-
sidering the actions of rivals. In this case, the
market value effect is the sole driver of firms’
entry choices, and the prediction is that firms
always collocate. The emergence of a significant
area where firms choose not to collocate highlights
the value of adding strategic interaction to location
decisions.
Figure 3 replicates Figure 2 using a specific
mode of competition, the Cournot model, and
a value of cl = 0.3 for the low-capability firm’s
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Figure 3. Equilibrium strategies: no-learning scenario,
Cournot model
marginal cost. We restrict the value of  (which
captures the relative size of the low-value market
and parallels parameter γ in Figure 2) and ε (which
captures firm l ’s relative cost disadvantage and
parallels parameter αl1 in Figure 2) to the interval
[0.6,1] to ensure that both firms are present in
both markets in the second period. We solve the
model for firms’ optimal quantities and maximum
profits for each point in the parameter space under
each strategy. Figure 3 depicts the combination of
parameters ε and  whereby (NL − l ) holds as
equality (e.g., where the maximum profits that firm
l can earn by avoiding or collocating with firm h
are equal).6
Naturally, the results based on the Cournot
model are the same as in the baseline model: as
markets become more similar ( increases), firms’
need to enter the most unique and attractive market
decreases, as does the likelihood of collocation.
As firms become more similar (ε approaches 1),
the likelihood of collocation increases because the
low-capability firm is better equipped to compete
in the high-value market, where it can capture a
larger share.
Local learning
Under the local learning scenario, firms learn
from their first-period experience at a rate λ> 0,
and the knowledge that firms accumulate through
experience in one market is not transferable
to the other market, so μ= 0. As a result, in
6 Note that in Figure 3, as well as in all figures based on the
Cournot model, the parameter  on the vertical axis is depicted
in the [0.67,0.82] range only for visualization purposes.
the local learning scenario, αHLij 2 (λ) = αLHij 2 (λ) =
αHHiH 2 (λ) = αi1, αHHiL2 (λ) = αi1, and αsiL2 = αsiH 2
for all strategies s . Clearly, local learning links
firms’ first-period expansion strategies to their
second-period absolute and relative capabilities:
if firms locate apart in the first period, their
absolute and relative capabilities in the markets
they entered will improve, but these improvements
are smaller in magnitude when they collocate.
We solve the game by backward induction.
Since firm h always enters high-value market H
in the first period (strategy sh1 = (∅,H )), we focus
only on firm l ’s entry strategy. Low-capability firm
l can avoid firm h by entering market L (strategy
sl1 = (L, ∅)), earning total profits HLl = V L +
αHLlL2W
L + αHLlH 2W H , or it can collocate with firm
h by entering market H (strategy sl1 = (∅,H )),
earning total profits HHl = αl1W H + αHHlL2 W L +
αHHlH 2W
H
. Firm l avoids firm h when its total ben-
efit from initially being a monopolist in low-value
market L exceeds its total benefit from initially
sharing high-value market H , that is, when
γ + (αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ
+ (αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ > αl1ρ (LL − l)
with αsij 2 = αsij 2 (λ).
Compared to the equivalent condition in the
no-learning scenario, (NL − l ), two new terms in
(LL − l ) capture the effect of learning on firm
l ’s equilibrium entry strategy: what we call the
entrenchment benefit of early presence in market
L and the opportunity cost of absence from H .
The first term,
(
αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ , captures firm
l ’s entrenchment benefit from an early presence in
low-value market L. This term is always positive
and it decreases firm l ’s incentives to collocate
with firm h in the first period compared to the no-
learning scenario, more so when the learning rate,
λ, increases. The intuition for this is that when
firm l enters and monopolizes market L initially,
its relative capability in L improves because firm
l learns while firm h does not, so αHLlL2 > αl1.
The more firm l can learn— that is, the higher
λ becomes—the more it improves its relative
capabilities. By contrast, when firm l enters and
competes with firm h in market H , neither firm
improves its absolute or relative capability in
market L because neither firm learns there, so
αHHlL2 = αl1. As a result, (LL − l ) is more likely
to hold compared to (NL − l ).
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The second term,
(
αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ, captures the
opportunity cost to firm l of allowing firm h to
improve its relative position in market H . This
term is always negative and, compared to the no-
learning scenario, it increases firm l ’s incentives to
collocate with firm h in the first period, more so
when the learning rate, λ, increases. Intuitively,
when firm l enters and monopolizes market L,
it forgoes the opportunity to learn in the other
market, H , and it allows firm h to improve its
absolute and relative capability as a monopolist in
that market, even more when the learning rate, λ,
increases. By collocating with firm h in the early
stages of expansion, firm l ’s relative capability in
market H decreases less because it curbs firm h’s
gains while boosting its own absolute capabilities
through learning; therefore, αHHlH 2 > α
HL
lH 2. As a
result, (LL − l ) is less likely to hold compared to
(NL − l ).
The extra terms in (LL − l ) introduce a new
element to the trade-off between collocation and
avoidance that is absent when learning does not
occur. With local learning, firms are driven not
only by initial firm and market heterogeneity, but
also by the need to improve, preserve, or minimize
the erosion of their relative capabilities over time.
For example, firm l chooses between the low-
and high-value markets to maximize learning and
improve or contain the erosion of its relative
capability in these markets.
While the effect of learning on firm l ’s entrench-
ment benefit and opportunity cost is clear,7 we are
unable to use our stylized model to predict the net
effect of learning on firm l ’s equilibrium strategy.
Equilibrium strategies depend on the comparison
of total profits associated with each strategy, which
in turn depend on the specific mode of competition
and functional forms assumed for demand, costs,
and learning.
To circumvent this limitation, we use the
Cournot model with exponential learning func-
tions described previously in The Stylized Model.
7 Entrenchment benefit and opportunity cost are triggered by the
same mechanism: a firm’s capability improves through learning
when it enters a market. However, they are defined relative to a
benchmark case, that of a firm being initially a monopolist in a
given market (and implicitly allowing its rival to be a monopolist
in the other market). Therefore, when firm h enters market H , the
entrenchment benefit that h gains in H is quantitatively different
from the opportunity cost that l experiences by not entering
H . Similarly, the entrenchment benefit that l gains by entering
market L is quantitatively different from the opportunity cost
that it experiences by not entering H .
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Figure 4. Equilibrium strategies: local learning sce-
nario, Cournot model
Although ideal, closed-form solutions are imprac-
tical for solving this type of highly complex and
nonlinear model. We opt instead to illustrate the
model’s outcome numerically. The model is solved
dynamically, so firms choose the quantities that
maximize their profits across time. In particular,
firms produce more in the first period in order
to increase their competitive edge in the second
period, even though the overproduction may com-
promise their profit in the first period. The steps
followed in the numerical analysis are (1) selecting
a value for the learning rate, (2) computing firms’
optimal quantities and maximum overall profits for
each point in the parameter space under each strat-
egy, and (3) finding the combination of parameters
ε and  whereby (LL − l ) holds as equality (e.g.,
where the maximum profits that firm l can earn by
avoiding or collocating with firm h are equal).
Figure 4 shows the results of this numerical
analysis for λ= 0 (our base case of no learning)
and for λ= 0.3—a value that is calibrated to
produce empirically reasonable cost declines.8 As
the learning rate increases from 0 to 0.3, firms
adopt the collocate strategy more often. Under
Cournot competition, firm l ’s opportunity cost of
being absent from high-value market H is larger
than its entrenchment benefit from being present in
low-value market L. By avoiding competition, firm
l ’s cost position erodes and it loses market share
to firm h in a high-value market, and the forgone
profit is not compensated for by its improved cost
8 This value means that each additional unit of quantity produced
results in an approximate 30% reduction in marginal costs
relative to the marginal cost of the last unit produced. This is
in line with previous studies, as summarized in Argote (1999),
first chapter.
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position or by its gain in market share over firm h
in the low-value market. Finally, note that both 
and ε have the same effect on strategies in the local
learning scenario as in the no-learning scenario:
collocation increases as firms become more similar
in capabilities and decreases as markets become
more similar in value.
Global learning
Similar to the local learning case, the strate-
gies followed in the first period determine firms’
second-period relative capabilities under a global
learning scenario. However, these two scenarios
differ on how transferable knowledge is across
markets. Under local learning, cumulative expe-
rience gained by firm i in market j changes
the firm’s second-period absolute capability only
in market j ; under global learning, a propor-
tion of its learning, μ, can be transferred across
markets. As a result, in the global-learning sce-
nario, αHLij 2 (λ, μ) = αLHij 2 (λ, μ) = αHHij 2 (λ, μ) = α1
and αsiL2 (λ, μ) = αsiH 2 (λ, μ) for all strategies s .9
As before, firm l can avoid firm h by entering
low-value market L (strategy sl1 = (L, ∅)) and earn
total profits HLl = V L + αHLlL2W L + αHLlH 2W H , or it
can collocate with firm h in high-value market
H (strategy sl1 = (∅,H )) and earn total profits
HHl = αl1W H + αHHlL2 W L + αHHlH 2W H . Rewriting
the profits, firm l avoids firm h when
γ + (αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ
+ (αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ > αl1ρ. (GL − l)
(GL − l) is similar to (LL − l): aside from the
market value and competition effects, as in the
local learning scenario, firm l would attain an
entrenchment benefit by monopolizing low-value
market L, and would bear an opportunity cost
by foregoing high-value market H . However, in
contrast to the local-learning case, αsij 2 is now a
function of both the learning rate, λ, and the rate
of transfer, μ, so that αsij 2 = αsij 2 (λ, μ), and the
transferability of knowledge across markets affects
the magnitude of both the entrenchment benefit
and the opportunity cost.
9 Note that when the rate of transfer is complete, that is, when
μ= 1, firm i ’s relative capabilities are equalized across markets,
so that αsiL2 (λ, μ) = αsiH 2 (λ, μ).
Consider first the entrenchment benefit(
αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ . When firm l is a monopo-
list in market L in the first period, firm l learns
at a rate λ in that market. In the local learning
scenario, this would lead to an increase in firm l ’s
absolute and relative capabilities, because firm
h does not learn in that market. In the global
learning scenario, however, firm h’s absolute
capability in market L also increases because
firm h can transfer, at a rate μ, the higher
absolute capability achieved in market H in the
first period. As a result, in the global learning
scenario, firm l ’s increase in absolute capability
is counterbalanced by an increase in firm h’s
absolute capability, so firm l ’s relative capability
from entrenching in low-value market L is lower
than under the local learning scenario (e.g.,
αHLlL2 (global learning) < αHLlL2 (local learning)). The
magnitude of the drop in firm l ’s relative capabil-
ity in the global learning scenario as compared to
the local learning scenario is determined by firm
h’s absolute capability improvement as a monopo-
list in market H : the larger the portion of absolute
capability improvement that firm h can transfer to
market L (the larger μ is), the larger the drop in
firm l ’s relative capability in market L becomes.
If firm l collocates with firm h in high-value
market H , its relative capability in low-value
market L also decreases compared to the local
learning scenario because firm h , due to its higher
relative capability, produces and learns more than
firm l (αHHlL2 < αl1). However, in the collocation
case, the drop in firm l ’s relative capability in
the global learning scenario, as compared to the
local learning scenario, is smaller in magnitude
than in the avoidance case because (1) firm h’s
absolute capability improvement in market H is
lower when it is a duopolist, and because (2) firm l
also improves its absolute capability in that market.
Consequently, because αHLlL2 decreases more than
αHHlL2 , firm l ’s entrenchment benefit of being a
monopolist in market L decreases, and firm l is
more inclined to collocate with firm h in high-
value market H . The urge to collocate becomes
stronger when the proportion of capabilities that
firms can transfer across countries increases (e.g.,
as μ increases).
We now analyze the opportunity cost(
αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ. When firm l is a monopo-
list in market L in the first period, its absolute
and relative capabilities in high-value market H
erode in the local learning scenario, because firm
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l does not learn in that market, while firm h does.
However, in the global learning scenario, firm l is
able to transfer to market H , at rate μ, the absolute
capability improvement attained as a monopolist
in market L in the first period. As a result, even
if firm l entrenches in low-value market L in
the first period, its relative capability in market
H erodes less under the global learning scenario
than under the local learning scenario (e.g.,
αHLlH 2 (global learning) > αHLlH 2 (local learning)).
The erosion in firm l ’s relative capability in
the global learning scenario, as compared to the
local learning scenario, is determined by the
absolute capability improvement that firm l attains
as a monopolist in market L; when firm l can
transfer a larger portion of its absolute capability
improvement from market L to market H (when
μ becomes larger), the erosion in firm l ’s relative
capability in market H is smaller, and thus its
relative capability is higher.
On the other hand, when firm l collocates
with firm h in high-value market H , its relative
capability in market H decreases compared to the
local learning scenario. The intuition for this is
that (1) firm h produces and learns more than firm
l because firm h has higher absolute capabilities
to start with, and (2) firm h has incentives to
produce and learn even more when it can apply
its capability improvement to a larger market,
(H + L), than when it can apply any improvement
only to high-value market H , as in the local
learning scenario. Consequently, because αHLlH 2
increases and αHHlH 2 decreases, firm l ’s opportunity
cost decreases. This tilts firm l ’s balance toward
avoiding firm h and entering low-value market L.
This inclination will increase as it becomes easier
for firms to transfer their capability improvements
across markets (e.g., as μ increases).
The effect of the rate of transfer of capabilities
on firm l ’s equilibrium entry strategy depends on
the comparison of total profits associated with each
strategy, and these total profits depend on the mode
of competition and the functional forms assumed
for demand, costs, and the learning process.
Therefore, to illustrate the effect of μ, we rely on
numerical analysis, using again the Cournot model
introduced in the previous section and the learning
functions described in Equations 1 and 2. The
numerical analysis repeats the process described
in the previous section for a particular calibrated
value for the learning rate and for selected rates
of transfer. Figure 5 depicts the results of this
0.80
0.82
0.74
0.76
0.78 Avoid
μ=0
0.68
0.70
0.72
R
el
at
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
t s
iz
e 
(Γ
)
Collocate
μ=1
μ=0.5
0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Relative firm capabilities (ε)
Figure 5. Equilibrium strategies: global learning sce-
nario, Cournot model. λ= 0.3
numerical analysis for λ= 0.3 and μ= 0 (the local-
learning case) and for λ= 0.3 and μ= 0.5, as well
as λ= 0.3 and μ= 1.
Figure 5 shows that, for a given learning rate
(λ= 0.3), firms collocate less often as the transfer
rate increases from 0 to 0.5 and then to 1.10
More generally, firms collocate less in the global-
learning scenario than in the local-learning one.
In comparison to the local-learning case, where
firm l ’s opportunity cost of absence from the high-
value market was larger than its entrenchment
benefit in the low-value market, the opportunity
cost decreases faster than the entrenchment benefit
in the global learning scenario. Intuitively, firm l
no longer needs to collocate with firm h to avoid
incurring the opportunity cost of absence from
the high-value market; it can simply avoid firm h
and transfer more of the capability improvement
it gains in the low-value market to the high-
value market. Thus, capability transfer acts as a
substitute for market entry.
Figure 6 brings together all of the learning
scenarios to summarize the effect of learning on
equilibrium strategies. As shown in Figures 4
and 5, firms are more likely to collocate in the
local learning scenario than in the no-learning
scenario, and less likely to collocate in the
global learning scenario than in the local learning
scenario. It is apparent from Figure 6, however,
that if the transfer rate is high, firms are less likely
to collocate in the global learning scenario than in
the no-learning one.
10 Although almost imperceptible due to the scale, note that,
consistent with Figure 2, the slope of the line separating the
collocate and avoid strategies changes with the learning rates in
Figures 4 and 5.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium strategies: no-learning, local
learning, and global learning scenarios, Cournot model
DISCUSSION
When commenting on the economic geography
literature, Krugman expresses the need to move
beyond the assumption of perfect competition
when he writes,
Essentially, to say anything useful or
interesting about the location of economic
activity in space, it is necessary to get
away from the constant-returns, perfect
competition approach that still dominates
most economic analysis (1991: 4).
This call triggered a revival of work that looks at
firms interacting across markets and time (Antra`s
and Yeaple, 2013; Ellickson and Zame, 2005),
an effort to which our paper aims to contribute.
In the same way that Ghemawat (2001) intro-
duced multidimensional distance between home
and host markets as a lens affecting a location’s
attractiveness, our work suggests a similar role for
strategic interaction. Importantly, this lens helps
us to explain not only one location decision at
a point in time, but also a set of location deci-
sions across time. After all, location decisions are
not static and isolated decisions related to spe-
cific geographic markets; they are events linked
across time and geography. When studying these
patterns empirically, overlooking strategic interac-
tion amounts to an omitted variable problem that
may bias estimates for coefficients associated with
location traits.
However, strategic interaction does not always
translate into the competition and deterrence our
paper suggests. The multimarket contact literature
suggests that firms enter the same markets as
competitors to soften competition. For instance,
Gimeno et al. (2005) find that firms competing
in the domestic market tend to follow each other
to the same foreign markets, while noncompet-
ing firms tend to avoid each other geographically.
While the multimarket contact literature focused
more on the consequences of firms sharing mar-
kets, our work provides a theoretical framework
to understand the antecedent of multimarket con-
tact: the competitive constraints in product mar-
kets that determine the number of contacts across
markets.
Our work creates a valuable and necessary link
between strategy and IB scholarship. By adding
concepts familiar to strategy scholars, such as
competitive advantage and strategic interaction,
we underline that a firm’s operations abroad are
also an important source of sustainable compet-
itive advantage in oligopolistic competition. The
paper also offers an alternative explanation for
collocation in global expansion. For example, our
model suggests different geographic expansion
paths depending on the relative value of markets
within a region. When a region is dominated by
one large country, collocation ensues and firms
compete. Competing firms produce less and learn
less, and as a result their costs in the second
period will be higher than if they hadn’t collo-
cated. By contrast, when a region has multiple
countries with similar market value, collocation
is rare, firms monopolize markets, and they pro-
duce and learn more. As a consequence, their costs
are lower in those markets than they would be
with collocation.11 Our model also demonstrates
that collocation depends in part on an industry’s
mode of learning, with local learning increasing
the likelihood of initial collocation, and global
learning decreasing it. In other words, instead of
explaining collocation as a function of agglom-
eration benefits (David and Rosenbloom, 1990;
Marshall, 1892) or mimetic behavior (Lieberman
and Asaba, 2006) due to asymmetric informa-
tion or uncertainty (Henisz and Delios, 2001), our
model offers an explanation based on strategic
interaction.
Our study has relevance for other research
streams in strategy, as well. It suggests that
firms can time market entry strategically, across
11 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
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time and locations, to make themselves more
competitive. For example, if in equilibrium a low-
capability firm foresees a better outcome when
it moves first, it may use that timing advantage
to shift the balance of power against its rivals.
These findings are consistent with Lieberman
and Montgomery (1988), who suggested that the
geographic scope of learning may be considered a
source of first-mover advantages that fuels spatial
preemption under strategic interactions. Other
factors influencing firm’s timing decisions can be
explored with similar game-theoretical approaches.
For example, Comino (2006) takes a game-
theoretical perspective to suggest that firms may
deliberately delay investment in a host country
in order to conceal information from competitors.
More recently, Hawk, Pacheco-de-Almeida, and
Yeung (2013) find that firms with high-speed
capabilities may wait longer to make high levels
of investment because they can afford to wait out
uncertainty in new markets. Our paper adds to
these a different potential role for timing: altering
the equilibrium routes of entries, and hence the
ability to improve capabilities, between rival firms.
The implications of entry timing also vary
across different learning scenarios. For example,
Walmart and Emirates Airlines avoided rivals ini-
tially. With global learning (experiences are par-
tially transferable across rural markers, and less
travelled routes), both firms located apart strategi-
cally. In industries characterized by local learning,
such as banking (due to different regulatory envi-
ronments and client needs across markets), MNEs
tend to enter in the same market for fear of los-
ing out in the learning game and thus allowing
entrenchment by their competitors. Such colloca-
tion patterns were obvious, for example, when
countries in Latin America first, and China later,
opened up their banking sector.
The level of abstraction in the model also
allows us to extend its predictions beyond entry
in geographic markets to, for instance, entry into
new product markets, contributing to the corporate
strategy literature. In this new context, learning
scenarios (i.e., local vs. global learning) represent
the ability of firms to exploit synergies across
industries when firms diversify; transferability
maps to the level of relatedness across industries.
Admittedly, there are limitations with our
approach, which also provide opportunities for
future research. First, our paper abstracts from
production factors, so it leaves out the role of
endowments or agglomeration economies as cen-
tripetal forces that trigger collocation (Hanson,
2001). Neither does it consider the effect of
strategic interaction in inputs markets on loca-
tions (Alcacer and Chung, 2013). An obvious next
step would be to add agglomeration economies
associated to inputs to our model, similar to the
work of Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2012)
in knowledge spillovers and competition.
Second, we made some assumptions in our
model to decrease its complexity. Relaxing those
assumptions can reveal new interesting dynamics
and identify boundary conditions for our findings.
For example, we assume that markets are equally
attractive to all firms while previous research
in IB suggests that attractiveness varies by an
MNE’s country of origin (Ghemawat, 2001);
we don’t allow for firms to exit, while exit is
a common outcome in international expansions
(Caves, 1996). Although some recent research
relaxes some of these assumptions (Alca´cer et al.,
2013), more work is needed.
Third, although we exploited firm heterogene-
ity by assuming difference in initial costs, other
sources of potential firm heterogeneity remained
unexplored in our model. Both the Walmart and
Emirates stories suggest that firms diverge not
only in their initial capability endowment, but also
in their ability to upgrade such capabilities—an
example of dynamic capabilities as defined in
the strategy literature (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen,
1997). In the context of our model, that would
mean that learning rates may vary by firm. More-
over, we assumed that the type of learning, local
or global, is industry driven and thus common for
all firms. Yet even within an industry, organiza-
tional structure and incentives, human resources
practices, and communication mechanisms are all
important drivers of knowledge transfer within
firm boundaries. Thus, certain firms may follow a
local learning model while others emulate a global
learning one. It will be interesting to explore how
heterogeneous learning scenarios and/or learn-
ing rates affect firms’ expansion trajectories
over time.
Finally, our model focuses on one type of
strategic interaction: competition in the product
market. Other forms of strategic interaction also
need development, such as collocation to soften
competition through price collusion, as suggested
by Ghemawat and Thomas (2008) among others.
We hope this study inspires future work to that end.
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CONCLUSION
This paper explores how strategic interaction and
learning jointly affect the geographic expansion
of heterogeneous firms across time and markets.
Our model crystalizes two novel effects at play
when firms strategically expand in the geographic
space: the opportunity costs of not entering a
market—an effect that encourages contempora-
neous entry—and the entrenchment benefits of
entering early—an effect that encourages firms to
delay collocation. Including both effects in future
research will provide a richer framework that better
describes actual location patterns across time and
markets. These strategic effects are very robust:
they emerge even when we use specifications with
different entry order and timing (high-capability
firm entering first, low-capability firm entering
first, and simultaneous entry).
Results from our model suggest that firms’ loca-
tion decisions look substantially different when
strategic interaction is included. In fact, contrary
to the prevailing view in the global strategy lit-
erature, it would appear that collocation is the
exception rather than the norm. The model pro-
vides several testable predictions. First, firms are
more likely to avoid each other when geographic
markets are similarly attractive because being a
monopolist in a slightly smaller market is prefer-
able to being a duopolist in a larger market. Sec-
ond, when markets are highly asymmetric in value,
collocation becomes more likely as firms become
more similar. This is because as a less-capable
firm improves is relative competitive standing, it
braves competition in a significantly larger market
instead of aiming for monopoly rents in a signifi-
cantly smaller market. Third, as competition inten-
sity increases, leading to a significant erosion of
market value from competition, firms tend to col-
locate less. This effect grows when firms are more
similar.
Finally, learning plays an important role in
determining the equilibrium entry strategies. The
avoid strategy provides a firm with an entrench-
ment benefit created by learning and using that
learning to improve its competitive position as a
monopolist in a market. But the avoid strategy
also entails an opportunity cost, because abstaining
from entering the other market allows a rival firm
to improve its competitive position as a monop-
olist there. When learning is local, an increase in
the learning rate increases the entrenchment benefit
of locating in a smaller market, but it increases
even more the opportunity cost of not locating
in a larger market, so that a less-capable firm is
more likely to collocate in order to preempt its
rival from learning and building a stronger compet-
itive position in a larger market. By contrast, when
learning is global, a less-capable firm can preempt
its rival from learning and building a stronger com-
petitive position in a larger market by transferring
capability improvements it gains as a monopo-
list in a smaller market. This ability to preempt
rivals increases with the rate at which learning is
transferred. Thus, transferability acts as a substi-
tute for market entry, decreasing the likelihood of
collocation.
For managers, this paper illustrates different
ways firms can use location choices across time
and geographic markets as a tool to enhance or
preserve a firm’s competitive position within an
industry. In that sense, it reveals the importance
of further research on geographic diversification
and its impact on value creation.
For strategy scholars, our paper aims to elicit
interest on dynamic strategic interaction among
rivals across markets. We followed a path of
formal modeling that has advantages and disad-
vantages. On the positive side, a formal model
allows us to explore the complex relationship
between market heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity,
and spatial strategic interaction in a parsimonious
and unequivocal way. However, to parsimoniously
deconstruct a complex phenomenon, we needed to
simplify the model’s elements. We hope that this
study will inspire future work in strategy to revisit
many of the simplifying assumptions we made and
to provide, collectively, a more accurate picture of
firms expanding across markets.
For managers, this paper offers important—and
sometime counterintuitive—insights into firms’
location choices. First, entering the most attrac-
tive market is not an optimal strategy for all
firms. In fact, as learning becomes more global,
some firms would be better off avoiding com-
petitors until they have managed to increase
their capabilities in less crowded markets. Sec-
ond, there is not a one-size-fits-all strategy for
international expansion: a location strategy that
works in an industry characterized by local learn-
ing may not work in an industry with global learn-
ing. Local learning requires collocation with rivals
across markets to preempt them from attaining
a strong competitive position in those markets;
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global learning encourages avoiding rivals because
knowledge transfer allows firm to more effec-
tively improve, or prevent the erosion of, their
competitive position across countries. Finally, this
paper prompts managers to think beyond a single
location choice-—based on evaluating the char-
acteristics of an individual market—to a loca-
tion strategy—a set of actions that link location
choices across time and geographic markets and
that account for the present and future locations
decisions likely to be made by rival firms.
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APPENDIX ALTERNATIVE
SPECIFICATIONS
In this appendix, we discuss two variations in our
model: (1) the low-capability firm moving first,
and (2) both firms entering simultaneously.
Table A1. Timing
t = 1 (a) l expands into a market
(b) h expands into a market, after observing
l ’s choice
(c) l and h compete and decide how much to
produce; first-period profits and
second-period capabilities realized
t = 2 (a) l and h expand in the other markets
(b) l and h compete and decide how much to
produce; second-period profits realized
Figure A1. The game tree: the low-capability firm
moving first
Low-capability firm moves first
A key assumption of our baseline model is that
the high-capability firm h moves first and then
the low-capability firm l acts upon observing
h’s decision. While this assumption simplifies the
exposition of the main ideas and is appropriate
in some real-life situations, in others the order
of expansion is reversed12 so that in the first
period, t = 1, (a) low-capability firm l expands first
into a market, and then (b) high-capability firm
h observes l ’s decision and subsequently expands
into a market. In this Appendix we show that, in
this alternative scenario, the ranges of parameters
over which firms avoid each other or collocate
are the same, but avoidance strategies can take
two forms: forfeit (when low-capability firm l
concedes high-value market H to its rival in the
first period) and seize (when firm l enters market
H anticipating that firm h will enter market L).
The timing of the game in the alternative scenario
is depicted in Table A1.
Maintaining the notation from our baseline
model, namely, that s = LL, LH , HL, or HH
describes the strategies employed by both firms,
where the first (second) letter indicates the
12 For example, Mobil entered the Russian oil market after
observing the entries of smaller firms such as Philbro and
Conoco (Janosz, Kou, and Spar, 1995).
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market that the high-capability (low-capability)
firm enters in the first period, this game can be
depicted as Figure A1.
As before, to identify the equilibrium entry
strategies that maximize firms’ total profits, si ,
we solve the game by backward induction—first,
for the no-learning scenario—and use the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium concept to identify
equilibrium strategies.
We start with the case where there is no
learning. Assume that low-capability firm l
enters high-value market H in the first period
(strategy sl1 = (∅,H )). High-capability firm
h can either avoid firm l by entering low-
value market L (strategy sh1 = (L, ∅), with
associated profit πhL1 = V L), or collocate with
firm h by entering the high-value market
(strategy sh1 = (∅,H ), with associated profit
πhH 1 =αh1W H =αh1ρV H = (1 −αl1)ρV H ).
Firm h will avoid firm l when its benefit from
being a monopolist in the low-value market, V L, is
greater than its benefit from sharing the high-value
market, αh1ρV H = (1 −αl1)ρV H , that is, when
γ > αh1ρ = (1 − αl1) ρ. (NL − h)
Naturally, when firm h enters the low-value
market (if (NL − h) holds), firm l has no incen-
tive to deviate from its strategy of entering the
high-value market because being a monopolist in
a high-value market and earning V H is better than
competing in the low-value market and earning
αl1W L. However, if (NL − h) fails to hold and
firm h prefers to enter the high-value market in
the first period (strategy sh1 = (∅,H )), firm l is
in the same situation as in our baseline model,
where firm h enters first into a market: firm l can
either avoid firm h by entering low-value market
L (strategy sl1 = (L, ∅), with associated profit
π lL1 = V L), or collocate with firm h by staying in
the high-value market (strategy sl1 = (∅,H ), with
associated profit π lH 1 =αl1W H =αl1ρV H ). Firm
l will avoid firm h under the exact same condition
as in our baseline model, that is, when its benefit
from being a monopolist in the low-value market,
V L, is greater than its benefit from sharing the
high-value market, αl1ρV H , or
γ > αl1ρ. (NL − l)
As a result, three distinctive equilibrium
strategies for entry emerge, depending on whether
conditions (NL − h) and (NL − l ) hold. When
condition (NL − h) (and implicitly (NL − l ))
holds, that is, when αl1ρ < (1 −αl1)ρ <γ ,
firms locate apart in the first period. How-
ever, in contrast to our baseline model, it is
now low-capability firm l that seizes the high-
value market, anticipating that high-capability
firm h will avoid collocation by entering the
low-value market. This equilibrium strategy,
seize, corresponds to sl ={(∅,H ),(L,H )} and
sh ={(L, ∅),(L,H )}. When condition (NL − h)
fails to hold and condition (NL − l ) holds, that
is, when αl1ρ <γ < (1 −αl1)ρ, firms also locate
apart in the first period as in our baseline model:
low-capability firm l enters the low-value market
(forfeiting the more attractive high-value market)
and avoids firm h , anticipating that firm h will
enter the high-value market. This equilibrium
strategy, forfeit , corresponds to sl ={(L, ∅),(L,H )}
and sh ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}. Finally, when both
(NL − h) and (NL − l ) fail to hold, that is, when
γ <αl1ρ < (1 −αl1)ρ, both firms enter the high-
value market. This strategy, collocate, corresponds
to sh ={(∅,H ),(L,H )} and sl ={(∅,H ),(L,H )}.
Since (NL-l ) in this alternative model is the same
as in our baseline model, the range of parameters
over which firms collocate or avoid each other in
equilibrium is the same as in our baseline model.
As with our baseline model, these equilibrium
entry strategies—whether firms avoid each other
or collocate—depend, in the absence of learning,
on the same fundamental effects: market value and
competition. The market value effect captures the
idea that, as markets are more similar in value (if γ
increases), each firm’s loss from entering the low-
value market, given by V H − V L = (1 − γ )V H ,
decreases. As a result, firms are more likely to
adopt a variant of the avoid strategy (forfeit or
seize). Similarly, the competition effect captures
the firm-level profit erosion resulting from (1)
competition intensity , which reduces market value,
and (2) market sharing , which reduces either
firm’s share of the already reduced market value.
Competition intensity reflects the idea that, as
competition intensifies (ρ decreases), each firm
has more to lose by entering the high-value
market (because market value erodes from V H
to W H = ρV H ), and therefore firms are more
likely to adopt a forfeit or seize strategy. Finally,
market sharing reflects the idea that, when firms
compete, a firm’s share of the market decreases
from a monopoly share of 100 percent to a share
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Figure A3. Equilibrium strategies: alternative-entry-
order model, no-learning scenario, Cournot model
determined by the firm’s relative capability. Thus,
when a firm’s relative capability weakens (if αi1
decreases), it has more to lose by entering the high-
value market because it can only capture a smaller
part of the reduced market value (αi1W H ). Again,
firms become more likely to adopt a variant of the
avoid strategy (forfeit or seize).
Figures A2 and A3 show the equilibrium
areas determined by conditions (NL − h) and
(NL − l ) for the general and the Cournot models,
respectively. The parameter for the Cournot model
is the same as in Section Modeling Approach, of
the paper: cl = 0.3 for the low-capability firm’s
marginal cost.
We now move to the scenarios where learning
occurs. As in our baseline model, the presence
of learning (whether local or global) introduces
two new terms in firms’ decision about whether
to avoid one another or collocate. Condition
(NL − h) is rewritten as
γ + (αLHhL2 − αHHhL2
)
ργ
+ (αLHhH 2 − αHHhH 2
)
ρ > αh1ρ = (1 − αl1) ρ (L − h)
while condition (NL − l ) is rewritten in the same
way as conditions (LL − l ) and (GL − l ) in our
baseline model
γ + (αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ
+ (αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ > αl1ρ (L − l)
where αsij 2 is a function of only the learning rate,
λ, in the local learning scenario, and a function of
both learning rate λ and the rate of transfer, μ, in
the global-learning scenario.
The new terms in (L − h) and in (L − l ),(
αLHhL2 − αHHhL2
)
ργ and
(
αHLlL2 − αHHlL2
)
ργ , capture
the entrenchment benefits firms accrue from an
early presence in the low-value market. In the
local-learning scenario, these terms are positive
and increase as learning rate λ increases, tilting
firms’ balance toward avoiding one another and
entering the low-value market. Intuitively, the
higher the learning rate, the better entrenched
a firm becomes with its early presence in the
market. In the global learning scenario, these terms
decrease in magnitude (and potentially change
sign) as rate of transfer μ increases. That is, with
the ability to transfer knowledge across markets, an
early presence becomes less critical for remaining
competitive in the second-period in the low-value
market, tilting firms’ balance toward collocating in
the high-value market.
The other new terms in (L − h) and in
(L − l ), (αLHhH 2 − αHHhH 2
)
ρ and
(
αHLlH 2 − αHHlH 2
)
ρ,
capture firms’ opportunity costs of absence from
the high-value market. In the local learning sce-
nario, these terms are negative and become more
so as learning rate λ increases, tilting firms’ bal-
ance toward collocating in the high-value mar-
ket. Intuitively, with a higher learning rate, the
absentee firm loses more ground to its rival in
the high-value market in the second period, as
the rival has significantly improved its capability
there. In the global learning scenario, being absent
from the market is not as detrimental because firms
can transfer their capabilities from one market to
another. Thus, these terms decrease in magnitude
(and potentially change sign) as rate of transfer
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Figure A4. Equilibrium strategies: alternative-entry-
order model, local learning scenario, Cournot model
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Figure A5. Equilibrium strategies: alternative-entry-
order model, global learning scenario, Cournot model
μ increases, tilting firms’ balance toward avoiding
each other.
Figure A4 depicts the results of the numerical
analysis on the Cournot model with the same
learning functions as described earlier, for λ= 0
(no learning) and for λ= 0.3 (the local learning
scenario). Figure A5 depicts the results of this
numerical analysis for λ= 0.3 and μ= 0 (the
local-learning case), and, respectively, μ= 0.5 and
μ= 1 (the global-learning case).
Similar to our baseline model described in
Section Modeling Approach, Figures A4 and A5
show that, in the local learning scenario, both firms
are more likely to enter the high-value market to
avoid the high opportunity costs associated with
absence from this market. In the global learning
scenario, both firms are also less likely to enter
the high-value market because they can avoid the
high opportunity costs of absence from this market
by transferring knowledge accumulated in the low-
value market.
Simultaneous-entry game
Another key assumption of our model is that
entry in markets is sequential. In particular, we
assumed that, in the first period, t = 1, (1) one
firm expands first into a market, then (2) the
rival expands into a market upon observing the
first firm’s decision. This assumption is realistic
when firms can observe their rivals’ expansion
and can change course in response. If expansions
are not observable, or if firms commit resources
to particular courses of action before observing
their rivals’ expansions, then the more realistic
modeling assumption is one wherein firms expand
simultaneously.
In this alternative model, the same four effects
underlie firms’ entry choices. Moreover, because
under any strategy, s , firms maximize the same
profits as in the sequential-entry models, the
conditions that determine firms’ equilibrium entry
choices and the areas where each equilibrium
strategy prevails remain unchanged compared to
the scenario where low-capability firm l enters
first into a market (which yields three equilibrium
strategies). The main difference is that, when firms
enter simultaneously, each firm has the opportunity
to enter high-value market H . Thus, in the area
where seize is the equilibrium strategy and firm l
enters first, the equilibrium could now be forfeit ,
as in the scenario where firm h enters first into
a market. In fact, there exists a third “mixed-
strategy” equilibrium, whereby each firm expands
initially into high-value market H with some
particular equilibrium probability.
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